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1. Realism and Political Philosophy
Discussions about realism are a characteristic trait of the last few 
decades of philosophical debate in the analytical tradition.1 These de-
bates have opened the way to a return of realism in many areas of phi-
losophy and in different philosophical contexts.2 Starting in the areas of 
metaphysics, epistemology and theory of cognition, discussions about 
realism have reached into philosophy of cognition, theory of action, the-
ory of normativity (Dancy 2003) and ethics (Brink 1989; Smith 1994; 
Audi 2013). 
The fields of theory of action, theory of normativity, and ethics are 
closely linked to political philosophy. Hence, discussions about realism 
should have important implications for political philosophy. These im-
plications, however, are generally overlooked, with a few recent excep-
tions (Audi 2011; Groff 2013). In political philosophy, the leading para-
digm is still dependent on the social contract tradition, and on the con-
ception of human action which goes with it. According to this concep-
tion, human action is directed towards ends set by our psychological 
makeup, and reason has a purely instrumental role in reaching those 
ends. The political implication is that we can be free in a negative sense: 
i.e., to the extent that we have no internal or external constraints jeopard-
1 Brock and Mares (2007) offer an overview of the debate. A paradigmatic example of the 
centrality of problems related to realism in contemporary philosophy is the work by Hilary 
Putnam. See De Anna 2001. 
2 Maurizio Ferraris has spoken of a “new realism” as a characteristic feature of contempo-
rary philosophy at large (2012). His claims opened an interesting debate in Europe: cf., for 
example, Ferraris and De Caro 2012 and Gabriel 2012 and 2013. 
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izing the attainment of our ends.3 Political power is hence always a bur-
den to our freedom, although it might be a necessary one. These views 
about individual freedom and political power have important implica-
tions concerning the reasons which keep us together in a political com-
munity and, hence, on the ontological consistency of the political com-
munity. 
This conception of human action has marked the social contract tra-
dition from the times of Hobbes and is rooted on the naturalist meta-
physics underpinning that tradition: it accounts for human action with-
out the need to introduce “queer” properties in the world, e.g. values, 
norms, teloi, goodness, ideas, etc. This view still prevails in the contem-
porary leading paradigm of political philosophy due to the great influ-
ence of the work of scholars such as John Rawls.4 It still recommends 
itself in the political arena, since it promises to grant political neutrality 
and to avoid all conflicts: it grants to each individual the possibility of 
acting according to his or her conception of the good, by trumping any 
attempt to offer an objective characterization of the good, which might 
have a claim to be imposed on everyone. On this view, the implication is 
that discussions about the good in political contexts (and by that I mean 
both in political philosophy and in political practice) should be avoided. 
Any claim about the good – it is said – would have disastrous, totalitarian 
implications, if brought into the political arena. Debates about realism, 
hence, are acceptable all the way up to moral philosophy, but should not 
be allowed to enter the realm of political discourse. The point is that po-
litical life is meant to bring about peace and agreement, by mediating 
among different perspectives of the good. In order to do this – it is usu-
                                                 
3 On this acceptation of the term ‘negative freedom’ and on its role in the social contract 
tradition see (Castellano 1993, 25-43; Ferry 2002). 
4 The claim that Rawls is committed to a negative conception of freedom could seem dubi-
ous. He openly claims (1971, 201 and ff.), indeed, that he wants to remain neutral about 
what freedom is, and that he accepts both conceptions of freedom (negative and positive) 
described by Benjamin Constant. However, Constant redefines the classical terms ‘positive 
freedom’ and ‘negative freedom’ from the political point of view, on the basis of assump-
tions about a conception of action and of practical reason (one typical of his time) which 
takes individual freedom to be merely the absence of internal or external constraints. 
Rawls follows Constant in this, as it is clear from the pages which immediately follow the 
reference to him. 
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ally thought – references to the good should be limited as much as pos-
sible, in order to avoid the possibility that theoretical disagreement 
might result in practical disagreement and ultimately in social conflict. 
In this essay I would like to counter this implication, by making 
some considerations about the relevance of realism in action theory and 
in ethics for political philosophy. I will claim that the premises which 
are normally taken to ground the above implication are not warranted: 
considerations about action theory and normative theory suggest that – 
contra the leading paradigm – our practical reason is not purely instru-
mental (section 2) and political power is not necessarily a constraint to 
our freedom (sections 3). In my view, this calls for a revision of the onto-
logical status of political communities (section 4), and suggests that dis-
cussions about the good are not only innocuous, but even required for 
the sake of social peace (section 5). 
 
 
2. Human Action, Reasons and Normative Realism 
 
What is a human action? By action I mean the control over one’s 
causal powers which one can be understood to own and be held respon-
sible for. As Elisabeth Anscombe (1957) famously noted, an action is 
such if there is a person who owns it. For someone to own an action 
means that there is someone who may respond by giving a reason to the 
question “why did you do that?” For example, a person gives some mon-
ey to a beggar on the street and we ask him “why did you do it?” He can 
answer, for example, “because he's hungry.” I say that he can answer so, 
because sometimes the person interrogated could lie and hide the rea-
sons that she had. 
We can grasp the full meaning of this definition of action if we think 
of cases where one does something, but that doing cannot be said to be, 
strictly speaking, one’s action. Suppose that, without realizing that there 
is a friend of mine behind me, I turn around and accidentally slap her 
on her face. “Why did you slap her?,” someone might ask. “I did not slap 
her,” I would answer, “I just bumped onto her accidentally.” In these 
cases, we would also refuse responsibility for what happened: to the 
question “why have you hurt her?” we would answer “It was not my 
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fault.” Further, the person affected could not be angry to us, at least as 
far as she is rational. 
It follows that a human being does what he does as human being 
(and not as a mere body that occupies space and moves) because he is 
guided by reason, and, therefore, is rational. Of course the amount of 
rationality that we need to claim that one owns certain actions and is re-
sponsible for them is pretty minimal, to use a term introduced by Robert 
Audi (2001, 50). Rationality is minimal in this sense: When we say that a 
person is rational in order to stress that she is “in herself,” that she does 
not do things that are out of control, as when, for example, she acts un-
der the causal influence of narcotics. We can imagine in such a case that 
when she wakes up – someone else can ask “is she rational now?”. Ra-
tionality, in this sense, admits of weaker or stronger degrees to which a 
person or a belief can be rational. This definition of rationality can simp-
ly involve consonance with reason, or it can involve a stronger commit-
ment to finding out truth and doing good. This distinction between de-
grees of rationality intersects with my argument to follow, but I will not 
have the space to discuss these intersections here. I am persuaded, how-
ever, that the notion of reason for action that I am employing applies 
across the board, even in the case of minimal rationality. 
Reasons for actions have an objective side and a subjective side. The 
objective side depends on the fact that reasons purport to give a descrip-
tion of states of the world. In the example above: “he is hungry,” i.e. a 
description of a state of the world is given as a reason to explain an ac-
tion. This state of the world is not by itself a reason, however, and – be-
sides other things – it must be seen as a reason by a subject in order to be 
such. 
A key feature of the instrumentalist view about practical reason 
which underpins the leading paradigm of political philosophy, as men-
tioned in section one, is that it takes this subjective facet of reasons as 
proof that a reason is the conjunction of an objective element – a belief 
about states of affairs – and a subjective element – typically a desire con-
cerning the relevant states of affairs (Davidson 1963). This leads to the 
view that our reason can rule our beliefs, without thereby being neces-
sarily able to affect our agency: only if a relevant belief is also in place, 
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can reason affect our agency. This is why reason is only instrumentally 
relevant in satisfying desires, which are set independently from it. 
The desire-belief analysis of reasons is particularly appealing to natu-
ralistically oriented philosophers, since it seems to account for many 
morally relevant aspects of our experience, without committing one to 
the existence of moral facts or normative features of reality. Desires – 
i.e., perfectly natural features of our psychology – would explain norma-
tive features of our behaviour. Hence, this account of reasons is normal-
ly accompanied by some form of moral anti-realism. This view is now 
far from gaining a large consensus (Dancy 2003, Vogler 2002), however, 
there are still important grounds for complaint, as follows: If the view 
were correct, one could have a certain belief about a moral judgment, 
e.g. that “action a is mandatory,” and not have a reason not to do a. In-
deed, reasons – under these assumptions – would be conjunctions of 
beliefs and desires, and one could lack the desire to a. This finds itself in 
tension with a feature of our moral discourse, namely that moral beliefs 
give us reasons to act even when we lack the corresponding desires. 
The shortcoming of the desire-belief account of reasons for action 
seems to me to suggest that the fact that reasons have subjective and ob-
jective facets should not lead to an analysis which breaks reasons for ac-
tion into an objective and a subjective part. Rather, in analyses of rea-
sons for action, subjective and objective aspects should be kept together. 
Let us see how this can be done. 
The fact that a reason for an action has a content and, then, describes 
states of the world, entails that reasons for actions can, on the one hand, 
be adequate or inadequate, and, on the other hand, are objective. They 
may be adequate or inadequate, since their contents can be true or false: 
things can be as they suppose or not: “Why have I given him some 
coins? Because he was hungry.” But the beggar could have not been 
hungry, and in this case the propositional content of the reason would 
be false. Furthermore, reasons are objective: whether the beggar was 
hungry or not does not depend on the feeling or the beliefs of the agent 
who thought he had those reasons for acting, but on how things were in 
reality. Even if the fact of wanting something is given as a reason by an 
agent, that wanting is a reason only in so far as that agent really had that 
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want, and this is an objective state of the world, no matter how question-
able grounding a reason on that fact might be. 
So far I have claimed that the reasons which explain our actions can 
motivate us, and have truth-evaluable contents, i.e. they are in a way ob-
jective. This does not imply that all we do is rational, since our practical 
rationality can fail in two primary ways. Firstly, agents do not always 
know the truth values of the contents of their reasons: one may have a 
partial view of the situation, and thereby believe true contents to be false, 
or the other way around. In cases of this sort, one’s reasons may turn 
out to be inadequate. For example, one might think one has a normative 
reason to do what one does, but in realty, is not justified. Secondly, the 
reasons which explain one’s action and moves one’s will might fail to 
really justify one’s choices: one’s explanatory reasons may be motivating 
but fail to be normative (Audi 2010). Indeed, the justification one gives 
for one’s actions may be bad reasons, and so may not really justify these 
actions. “Why did you steal the bag from the lady?” Answer: “The lady 
seemed quite rich; I was hoping to find a rich haul.” All this suggests 
that an agent is an agent only if she is rational (if she is guided by rea-
sons, and therefore the effects of her movements are not purely ran-
dom), but also that the rational capacity of a human agent is in many 
ways limited. 
Above, I said that reasons may be adequate or inadequate, and that 
this depends on the fact that their content can be true or false. This as-
sumes that the reasons are not simply their contents. What are they? 
The above example shows that a person can express her reason to act by 
uttering a sentence as an answer to a why-question. This suggests that a 
reason is a function of its content determined by the particular situation 
in which a sentence expressing that content can be uttered (although, 
the sentence does not have to be uttered: often we have reasons to do 
what we do, even if we do not express them verbally, either aloud or in 
an introspective form). The content of a reason represents a state of af-
fairs, which, in the eyes of the agent, justifies her action. This fact justi-
fies, I believe, considerations about the conditions of its possibility, both 
on the subjective and on the objective side. A state of affairs can be seen 
as a reason by an agent, since that state of affairs is recognized as having 
some order – i.e., as something positive and good – but it is seen as an 
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order or an asset that is deficient in some ways and that can be improved 
by the agent herself. A reason for an action, then, expresses a way in 
which that action realizes a good, the possibility of which is recognized 
by the agent in reality. In our example, the utterance of ‘he is hungry’ 
can be seen as giving reason if these conditions are met: (i). There is an 
individual, i.e. a human, which is recognized as having an intrinsic or-
der (e.g., being a living organism, with a digestive apparatus needing 
food) and being worthy as such; (ii). The individual is recognized as be-
ing deficient in his order (e.g., lacking the food he needs); (iii). The 
agent realizes that he has the power to complete the lack of order in that 
individual. 
To say that the end of human action is a good is not to support an 
overly optimistic outlook on human nature, but only to recognize a fea-
ture of our agency which is compatible with our fallibility: the good 
sought by the agent is such in his view, but he can fail in the recognition 
of the good for the two kinds of limitations of our rationality seen above. 
The claim that the agent seeks a good by recognizing and completing an 
order which is already partially realized in reality can help us explain bet-
ter the sources of our limitations. Indeed, the information on the basis 
of which an agent recognizes an order in reality and a way of improving 
it may be defective in ways which undermine the normative reasons one 
thinks that one has. For example, I believe that something is a living or-
ganism which needs food, but it is really just a sophisticated robot which 
only needs electric charge. Similarly, one might be defective in their sub-
jective response to the lack of order to be found in reality and to the pos-
sible ways of improvement. So one might recognize that someone else 
needs food, and see providing him some spirits as the best way to make 
up for that. In both cases, one does not have the normative reasons one 
thinks one have. 
So far I have highlighted connections between reasons for action, 
goods, and normativity. These notions can be interpreted in a moral and 
in a non-moral sense. There might be reasons, goods to be achieved, and 
normative grounds for incompatible directions of action. We have rea-
son to follow, achieve and consider only all things considered reasons, 
goods, or normative grounds, respectively. Furthermore, not all all things 
considered reasons are moral: I may have a reason to go for a walk (e.g., it 
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may be just that I desire it), without that being a moral reason. A moral 
reason is one that is seen by the agent as requiring an obligatory re-
sponse from him, as from any other rational agent who happens to be in 
a situation similar in relevant ways. Where the border between the realm 
of non-morally relevant and morally relevant reasons lies depends on 
what the agent sees at good, and, consequently, it might or might not be 
justified. 
The conclusion we have reached shows that human action is in a 
sense intrinsically normative: not in the sense that it can be always ex-
plained by reasons which are normative, but in the sense that it can be 
explained only by reasons that the agent fallibly beliefs to be normative. 
This leads to a form of normative realism: the grounds of normativity – a 
partial order and ways of implementing it – can be found in reality. 
However, this is an epistemically moderate sort realism: the good as 
such can only be recognized from the point of view of an agent and prac-
tical rationality of agents is fallible, as we have seen. Let us now look at 
practical fallibility in further depth. 
 “Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor,” as Ovid wrote: our prac-
tical fallibility is a common human experience of all times. The point is 
that our practical rationality is limited, and the study of its limitations is 
one of the major contributions of contemporary moral philosophy. First-
ly, there are the epistemic limitations we have already considered above: 
an agent always has a practical vision of the situation in which she acts, 
and facts which elude her recognition could be relevant for her choices. 
Secondly, our practical reason is not just a form of reasoning, but it is a 
network of cognitive and volitional capacities which include both reason-
ing and insight. Often, we just see what is good or bad, without having 
to reason about it. The interaction between these faculties offers several 
occasions for failure. Thirdly, we often have different reasons suggesting 
different courses of action and must choose between them. Our choice 
can be less than fully rational because of our epistemic limitation, but 
also because of the influence that our desires and our habits exercise on 
our deliberative processes. Virtue theory is relevant in this connection: 
our habits are virtues when they enable reliable rational deliberative pro-
cesses in us, and shape the structure of our desires in ways which are 
conductive to recognizing and following good reasons for action. Habits 
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are also important in shaping our insights about good and evil, and in 
establishing the weight we give to different reasons in our deliberative 
processes. Fourthly, and finally, we are free to act against our best judg-
ments, even if our tendency to rationalize our bad deeds suggests that 
thus acting violates and forces our nature in important ways.5 
 
 
3. Politics as Something We Do 
 
The limitations of our practical rationality suggest important ways in 
which our agency is connected to, and depends on, the communities to 
which we belong. First, communities contribute to the constitution of 
our moral identity; second, communities can help our moral flourishing; 
third, communities can be burdens to our flourishing. Let us consider 
these points in turn. 
Communities contribute to the constitution of our identity in two 
main ways (De Anna 2012b, Chs. 3 and 4). First, our practical rationality 
depends on our linguistic abilities, and our linguistic abilities are shaped 
by community-based linguistic norms. Furthermore, pragmatics has 
shown many ways in which our community-normed language can create 
rituals and social facts which are both contents of our practical delibera-
tions and grounds for our practical judgments. Second, our habits, our 
virtues and our vices, are largely influenced by the education we received 
and, even as adults, by the social environment in which we live. Howev-
er communities shape our moral identities, they do not determine them: 
our practical rationality and our freedom are constitutive of us in ways 
that a community cannot change.  
Communities can help us to improve our practical rationality for at 
least two reasons. First, they furnish us with rules for interpreting moral 
reality which are the result of long traditions and often survived because 
they were good-conducive. This puts us in a better position than we 
                                                 
5 This fourth point is only available to compatibilists and libertarians about free will. I 
think that an acceptable conception of free will must lay in one these two families of posi-
tions, since I believe that deterministic conceptions of action fail to account for our experi-
ence of freedom and for our moral experience: two sections of our experience which are 
too basic to be bracketed away. I will not argue for this point here, however. 
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would be in if we had to start moral reasoning from scratch. Second, in 
communities we have to confront views of the good different from our 
own, endorsed by others: this forces us to press our epistemic limits and 
to improve our outlook of reality, and pushes us to develop our reason-
ing abilities for the sake of being able to justify our choices to others 
(Mill 1859, Ch. 1). 
Communities can, however, also be burdens to us: if we grow up in 
an abusive context we might develop quite distorted conceptions of what 
is good, and even in adult life, by being embedded in vicious social con-
texts, we might end up acquiring habits which put our capacity to recog-
nize and respond to good reasons at risk. 
The political community has a special role – among other communi-
ties – in shaping moral individuality. We can distinguish various kinds 
of community, depending on the purpose for which they exist and for 
which humans form or remain in them. The political community is dif-
ferent from other communities, since it does not exist for a particular 
purpose: the family is formed for the sake of everyday life (procreation 
and mutual support), an entrepreneurial society for the sake of a certain 
business, a sports club for practicing a certain sport. The political com-
munity, however, has no particular purpose of this kind. Why does the 
political community exist? We can note that by being in the political 
community we can do, at our best, anything we want to do. The political 
community helps us to excel in what we want to do. This means that it 
helps us to be better agents. The purpose of the political community, 
therefore, is to help us to develop our practical rationality, and it survives 
and keeps existing to the extent that, at least in a limited way, it fulfils 
this function (De Anna 2012a, Ch. 2). 
These claims are relevant both at the descriptive and at the normative 
level. What the political community does, and what it must do, is per-
fecting us. This is not a conceptual confusion, but it is a necessary con-
sequence, once we have abandoned the Humean assumption that hu-
man action is reducible to the combination of a desire and a belief. Since 
the political community is the result of our actions, it can only be under-
stood as a good, a reason we have to stay together. The aim of perfecting 
its members in practical rationality is therefore what causes a political 
community to be what it is, and what allows us to identify it as an “ob-
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ject.” Being a functional object, the political community has an end 
which is both the principle of identity and the normative ground for the 
choices that the community needs to make. Hence, its aim is also a cri-
terion for assessing a community. 
This account of the political community also explains a fact of our 
experience: the political community is superordinate to other communi-
ties, since it assesses whether and how they carry out their tasks, and 
rules them. All communities are outputs of our actions. Since the politi-
cal community aims at allowing us to do what we do at our best, it will 
also help us to make the most of the actions with which we constitute 
other communities. Hence, the political community also perfects other 
communities. To do this, it will have to take a stand about what is good 
for each of them, and it will have to rule them. 
Authority is the mode through which the political community 
achieves its end (Green 1990). By “authority,” I mean that the political 
community cannot use mere power, contra a common assumption of 
the social contract tradition: its ability to act is based on the recognition, 
on the part of its members, that it pursues a good and that it is reliable. 
Hence, authority is based on consent, seen as a rational recognition of a 
good, not as an option for any project whatsoever. This does not mean 
that every individual will agree with any decision of the authority. Rather 
it means that, although we can often be critical of the institutions and 
their decisions , we continue to think that, for the role they have taken in 
the course of their history, they are still worthy of our trust and that it is 
more rational to follow their prescriptions than to ignore or dismantle 
them. Authority is therefore not followed because it uses force (although 
sometimes it will also have to do that) and its exercise is always morally 
qualified, the criteria being whether it achieves a good that the commu-
nity can share and whether there is a normative reason for its decisions. 
The choices of authorities can be good or bad. 
To say that the political community should help its members to rec-
ognize and pursue the good does not mean that it should always enforce 
what seems good on those who have a decision-making function, for two 
reasons. First of all, even those who are in a position to make a decision 
that has political significance have limited practical rationality. For this 
reason, they should always doubt their understanding of what is true 
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and good. Second, those who hold political decision-making roles should 
not fully enforce all the goods that they recognize, since they must also 
consider the beliefs and expectations of the members of the community 
in which they have a role of authority, for three reasons. First, they shall 
only impose those goods that can be recognized as such, at least by a 
(non-necessarily numerically) significant section of the community, oth-
erwise authority collapses. Second, if an objective good radically trans-
cends the possibility of recognition of the members of the community, 
given their epistemic level, imposing it would de-humanize those on 
whom it is imposed. Human action is based on the ability to act freely 
and rationally. To impose an end on someone’s action when one genu-
inely cannot recognize that good as such, despite one’s sincere efforts, 
would amount to forcing one to act against what one sees as good and 
that kind of action would be to treat them as non-human. Third, even in 
the case of agents who want to do what they recognize as evil – i.e., who 
want to use their freedom in dubious ways, political authority must 
sometimes tolerate evil, in matters of no great moral weight: the growth 
of moral identity can sometimes require the experience of pain and the 
sense of defeat or loss that follows from moral failure. Accepting minor 
evils can lead to greater goods. 
These observations on the nature of the political community suggest 
that the community is something we do, and something we have a rea-
son to do, i.e. something which we see as good for us, since it helps us 
to reach a practical good which is such for all of us, i.e. the common 
good. The recognition and the pursuit of that good cannot be decided in 
the abstract, but only in the historical circumstances of the life of a 
community, i.e. from the point of view of the agents who give rise to the 
community or keep it existing by consenting to it. The upshot is that a 
certain plurality of visions of the good can and should be accepted, ac-
cording to the concrete historical circumstances of the community. The 
structure of the community, i.e. the features of all the individuals who 
constitute it and the arrangement of the kinds of humans that thereby 
shape it, define the range and the scope of the common good which a 
political community can recognize and seek. 
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4. Moderate Political Realism 
 
We have seen that the notion of a good is fundamental in shaping 
the choices of individual agents and in constituting the communities 
that individuals give rise to, including the political community. This ep-
istemically modest moral realism marks a considerable distance from 
the leading paradigm of political thinking, according to which political 
societies are aimed only at peace, seen as the end of conflict, i.e. at allow-
ing people to satisfy at the highest possible degree their desires – or 
whatever pro-attitudes they might have – under the assumption that 
those desires are the rulers of reason, and are not ruled by it. By con-
trast, the role that I have attributed to the good in human action suggests 
a quite different outlook concerning the relation between individuals 
and political communities. Political communities turn out to be more 
ontologically consistent than the leading paradigm suggests. Moral real-
ism leads to a form of political realism. 
Given the role of the good in shaping individual action and, hence, 
political consent, when political authority takes a position on a certain 
issue, such a commitment is seen as a moral judgment by the members 
of the community, and, thereby, it will influence their perception of the 
good and their moral reasoning. Similarly, when authority does not take 
a stand about a certain moral issue, even its silence will have a moral 
role, since it will be read – for example – as the statement that all alter-
native courses of action are morally on a par with this one. The silence of 
authority, then, is not neutral, but it has moral significance. 
This conclusion indicates that there is a quite strong tie between the 
political sphere and the individual sphere. The nature of the political 
community suggests various ways and different forms in which individ-
ual choices can influence the political sphere. In general it can be ob-
served that, if, as we have seen in the last paragraph, the end of the polit-
ical community is the good and the true, and if, as we have seen in the 
second paragraph, the goal of the individual is the good, then every hu-
man action is, in principle, politically relevant and therefore has a politi-
cal dimension. This does not mean, of course, that every human action 
must conform to a political decision or, still less, that it must depend on 
one: it just means, on the one hand, that each action can be evaluated by 
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political authorities and, secondly, that the mere fact that an action is 
performed calls for a public, political recognition of its legitimacy. 
We could say that the moral identity of an agent is shaped (though 
not determined) by his membership to a community, and primarily to a 
political community. Moral individuality is politically significant because 
the actions to which it gives rise, in their individuality and particularity, 
question, challenge and test the notion of the good that is recognized by 
the political community through the functions of its legitimate authority. 
This link between the individual and the public or communitarian 
dimension is also realized in other forms of community. Think of the 
linguistic community at large. The linguistic act with which one makes a 
promise is effective if it follows a certain ritual: for example, the person 
who performs it should pronounce the words with a serious tone, look-
ing at his interlocutor in the eyes, without laughing or making strange 
gestures in the meantime. Now suppose that I want to accomplish effec-
tive speech acts in order to produce a promise, but I do not follow the 
ordinary ritual. Of course, my actions will not deviate too much from the 
original ritual because otherwise my gestures would be ineffective. But 
suppose that I begin to perform acts that are intended to be valid only if, 
while I utter certain ritual words, I jump up and down. Among my 
friends, the rumour might spread that I give that meaning to this kind of 
acts and they may begin to use the same ritual. My new ritual might 
eventually be accepted by the entire community (and thereby acts which 
follow it will be accepted in the eyes of all members of the community) 
only if my new rule is universally accepted, that is if it gives birth to a 
recognized alternative of the rite of promising. My claim that one can 
promise in a certain way, in short, cannot be limited to my actions, but 
must have a “public” recognition. 
The case of the political community is different from that of other 
communities, due to the specific features of the political community: its 
direction to a good pertaining to all. An action done by a member of a 
political community has a claim to be recognized as good or at least neu-
tral by the whole community. We have seen that political authority may 
have to tolerate evil actions for the sake of avoiding greater evils. This 
silence can be read in an ambiguous way by the members of the com-
munity. Nevertheless, when one wants to do X, one thinks that X is good 
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or neutral, and one cannot therefore be satisfied if the authority lets 
someone do X for the sake of mere tolerance: she expects the recognition 
of the goodness or neutrality of X. For this reason, the acceptance of a 
plurality of mutually incompatible positions about the distinction be-
tween what is morally neutral, what is morally obligatory or permissible, 
what is tolerable and what is not tolerable will always be an unstable po-
sition, which calls for a solution to the epistemic and social problems 
which sometimes justify it. In short, political authority cannot but com-
promise itself about truth and about the good. 
The upshot of this is that by deciding to regulate a certain kind action 
or not to regulate it, authority cuts spaces of privacy from the realm of 
the public. The realm of privacy is then defined by the range of actions 
which are considered morally indifferent or tolerable. The realm of the 
public is that concerning matters in which authority judges that actions 
of members must be regulated. The sphere of moral indifference is 
filled with reasons that an agent is not obliged to respond to. The sphere 
of the tolerable is filled with reasons that an agent is obliged to respond 
to, although political authority judges that it is not reasonable to impose 
that obligation. The sphere of the public is filled with reasons that every 
rational agent has an obligation to respond to and such that authority 
judges necessary to enforce a response to them. 
As we have seen at the end of the second section, the border between 
the domains of morally relevant and morally neutral reasons depends on 
the perception of the good of each individual agent. Given that the polit-
ical community is something done by individual members in the ways 
considered in section three, the border between what is permissible, 
what is tolerable, and what must be publicly enforced cannot be set a 
priori: it depends on the perception of the good of the members of the 
community, on their shared traits – that is, their shared character and 
habits, and on the notion of a common good that they, as a political 
community, have reached at a certain point of their historical trajectory. 
This is not to say that such a distinction has no criteria of correctness: as 
we have seen, authority can persist and strengthen itself to the extent 
that it can reliably conduct its members to the good. The point, however, 
is not trivial. It suggests that we cannot expect that communities with 
different existential trajectories recognize the same borders between the 
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private and the public, between what is morally indifferent or at least 
tolerable, and what is to be ruled. Like the good, an explanation of an ac-
tion can only be recognized from the point of view of the agent, and just 
as an agent’s response depends both on his rationality and on the fea-
tures of his moral identity, so the common good of a community can on-
ly be practically recognized from the point of view of the community, i.e. 
from the point of view of its members. The moral identity of the mem-
bers, however, is shaped, although not determined, as we have seen, by 
the political community in which they live. We can now add that habits 
and moral individualities are not homogenous within a community: any 
community has an internal articulation of groups and sub-communities 
which is the result of its historical development. In a way, the articula-
tion of a community constitutes its individuality. Just as human individ-
uals can recognize the goods to reach towards with their actions only 
from the points of view of their moral individualities, so a community 
can only recognize the common good which can be accessed from the 
point of view of its articulation. 
The conclusion we have reached constitutes a sort of moderate politi-
cal realism: it takes political communities to have a certain degree of on-
tological consistency. The tie which binds the community together is the 
fit between the habits and the moral individualities of its members and 
the articulation of the community. This marks an important difference 
from the view of society supported by the leading paradigm: according to 
that view, individuals are independent atoms united only by the need for 
protection and by the desire to maintain the highest possible degree of 
independence. Virtually any set of rational beings can be bound together 
in that way. By contrast, my view purports that only humans suitable for 
a certain community can find a place where they fit in its articulation. 
The suggested realism, though, is moderate. By this I mean that the 
unity of the political community cannot be overstated. The bond is not 
such that it can ontologically determine its members. One is what one is 
– i.e., a rational agent with certain individual features – even if one does 
not remain in one’s community. According to the point of view that I 
am suggesting, a strong form of an organic conception of political enti-
ties, such as Hegel’s, makes the opposite mistake to the leading para-
digm. 
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An example is useful here to illustrate the half-way ontological status 
of political bonds that I propose. In our current multicultural societies, 
we often encounter people who have experienced abandoning their 
motherland and starting a new life abroad, very often in remote parts of 
the world. The very existence of migrants shows that the ontological sta-
tus of a person is not determined by her motherland(s). Migrants can go 
somewhere else and live a rich and fulfilling life, a life which is very of-
ten – and this is usually what they hope when they leave – much better 
than the life they could have expected in their motherland(s). However, 
no matter how well integrated they are in their new countries, many ex-
perience the feeling that they cannot be fully understood by their new 
fellow citizens, and that they cannot fully understand them either. Often 
they search for ways of socializing or living a public life which remind 
them the typical modes of their homelands. It is as if their habits and 
their ways of responding to situations of life were tuned for a certain 
form of social and political life, and they keep looking for it. As is typical 
for human affairs, this is not universally true, and there are cases of 
people who cannot fit in their homeland and find relief in other political 
communities. But as usual, in human affairs, generalizations hold statis-
tically, not absolutely. Furthermore, the very fact that someone does not 
fit in one’s homeland and has to flee shows that a fit is required for a 
functional and successful relation between individuals and political in-
stitutions. Hence, even if we are not ontologically made to be in our 
communities, in a sense we are shaped by them and for them. 
 
 
5. The Good in Political Discourse 
 
I started off by pointing out that, according to the leading paradigm, 
talking about the good in political contexts should be avoided, because it 
can fuel disagreement, whereas politics should seek the end of conflict. 
This normative implication is normally grounded – among others – on 
two premises: (i). That the ends of human actions are not ruled by rea-
son, but by desires which are potentially divergent and irreconcilable 
across different people; (ii). That political societies are formed for the 
sole sake of maximizing desire satisfaction. In the above sections I have 
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supported a view of human action and the political community which 
denies the views of practical reason and political society proposed by the 
leading paradigm. This takes the ground from under the feet of the 
normative implication about talking of the good in politics. My points, 
however, set the stage for two other steps, one descriptive and one nor-
mative: I would like to claim that talking about the good in political dis-
course is both unavoidable and, further, welcome. 
Ought implies can. So, we ought not to speak about the good in polit-
ical contexts only if this can be avoided. However, the points I have 
made above about individual action and the political community suggest 
that we cannot avoid speaking about the good in political contexts. 
Hence, it is not true that we ought not to speak about the good in politi-
cal contexts. This means that the normative implication of the leading 
paradigm on which I have been focusing from the beginning of this es-
say is not only ungrounded, it is also false. One might wonder: why do 
the points I made above about individual action and the political com-
munity suggest that we cannot avoid speaking about the good in political 
contexts? Well, recall that individual human agents aim always at what 
they see as good, and political communities aim always at what they can 
see as the common good. This implies that even if we do not use the 
word ‘good’ – or one of its derivatives or analogues – we still speak about 
the good when we speak about human action, individual or political. By 
not using the world ‘good’ – or one of its derivatives or analogues – we 
do not avoid really speaking about the good, but we speak about it in 
disguise. 
An apt example can be found in the leading paradigm itself. That 
paradigm promises to be neutral about the conceptions of the good that 
individual citizens embrace, and affirms that political discussions 
should focus on other issues. At the same time, however, it cannot really 
allow that all conceptions of the good which can possibly be held by citi-
zens be equally acceptable, since those which deny equal respect for the 
opinions of all should be ruled out from the spectrum of reasonable, ac-
ceptable positions. This claim, however, conceals a commitment toward 
a certain conception of the good, according to which a certain good is 
ranked as the highest, and as setting criteria for the evaluations of ac-
tions: this is the conception according to which the human will, or hu-
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man freedom (seen as the possibility of realizing at the highest possible 
degree one’s desires or pro-attitudes) is the highest good. My contention 
here is not that this conception is wrong, it is simply that it is a concep-
tion of the good, even if it is under disguise. My last, normative point is 
this: if commitment and reference to a conception of the good in politi-
cal contexts is unavoidable, then political philosophy and political prac-
tice should openly discuss the good in individual and political action, ra-
ther than in disguise. There are at least three simple reasons which sup-
port this normative claim. First, as Mill pointed out (1850, Ch. 1), when 
a statement, a theory, or a worldview, albeit true, is passed through a 
processes of public scrutiny and discussion, the rational warrant and the 
conviction of those who hold it are strengthened. Openly discussing the 
good reinforces confidence in it. Second, when conceptions of the good 
belonging to different political stake-holders are not openly discussed, 
unwarranted alliances can be formed, and these are likely to lead to un-
expected breakdowns, which are likely to ruin trust and cohesion among 
citizens. Third, when supporters of different conceptions of the good ar-
gue openly in favour of their views, they might eventually come to real-
ize – when that is the case – that they lack knock-down arguments which 
might convince all fellow-citizens of their views. When this happens, 
members of the community can be more tolerant toward positions dif-
ferent from their own, since they are able to recognize that other people 
hold views different from theirs, and do so rationally , not as a result of 
bad faith or hidden agendas. Hence, trust and collaboration will in-
crease. 
The leading paradigm does not question the legitimacy of talking 
about the good in political contexts for mistrust of these reasons, but ra-
ther for the fear that such a talk could be dangerous and increase social 
conflict. I would like now to argue that this fear is totally unwarranted. 
Certainly, the fear would be warranted if the assumptions of the leading 
paradigm that we have discussed were true, i.e. if practical reason were 
just an instrument for the satisfaction of desires which are quite arbi-
trary and criterion-less, and if the political community only had the role 
to stop, through its power, the conflict which would certainly arise 
among citizens entirely guided by potentially irreconcilable desires. In-
deed, in this case, if everyone were to bring their own personal concep-
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tions of the good as objective and real matters that everyone else should 
recognize and approve, conflict would increase. 
I have countered those assumptions, and the views that I have pro-
posed in their place promise very different results. I have suggested that 
human reason is not just the instrument for the satisfaction of criterion-
less desires, but the capacity to recognize an already partially realized 
order in reality and to find ways to improve it. I have also contended that 
the political community is not just an expedient to anesthetize conflict, 
but it is a way to reach a common good sharable by all members of the 
community. If this is so, the political discussion of different perspectives 
of the good is not likely to increase disagreement, but to overcome it. 
Furthermore, disagreement would be overcome not by the imposition of 
arbitrary solutions to all parts through the exercise of mere power, but 
by the rational agreement on a sharable perspective on the good reached 
through a discussion concerning what is good. 
The key point of the argument is that reasons have a content which 
presuppose the recognition of an order partially realized in reality and of 
possible ways of implementing it. Disagreement originates in the limita-
tions of our practical rationality, which I mentioned in section 2. The 
partiality of the point of view of each individual, and the constraints 
which might bias our responses to the normative reasons which we 
might otherwise recognise, play the fundamental role in generating dis-
agreement. Unlike desires which are deft to reason, however, our differ-
ent perspectives on the good can, in principle at least, be reconciled 
through rational processes. The first step would be to reach a sharable 
description of the facts which constitute the landscape in which a deci-
sion has to be taken. 
My point is not that once all the facts are spelled out properly practi-
cal disagreement will necessarily be overcome. Such a thesis would not 
be supported by my arguments. The account of practical reason given in 
section two is consistent with the possibility that two subjects might dis-
agree about what reasons they have, even if they agree on all the relevant 
facts. Indeed, I claimed that there is a subjective aspect of reasons, and 
different subjects may respond in different ways to the same facts. If one 
could show that human subjects are all akin in their metaphysical struc-
ture such that they will respond in similar manners when facing the 
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same situations a stronger case for the possibility of agreement could be 
made. But I have not said anything to support that thesis in this essay. 
My argument here, however , does not rest on such a strong thesis. In 
order to reach my conclusion, it is enough to claim that discussions 
about the good increase the chances of overcoming disagreement in re-
spect to strategies in which reference to the good is avoided. 
My point is that if we do not try to rationally assess and compare our 
different perspectives on the good, the disagreement among our views 
will certainly be maintained, and all the sacrifices which will have to be 
made of the parties in order to give equal satisfactions to everyone, will 
be taken ultimately as unjust frustrations of one’s desires. On the other 
hand, if we try to assess and compare our perspectives on the good, it is 
at least possible that some of us can correct our judgments about order 
in a direction leading to agreement. Even in less fortunate cases, when 
one does not revise one's own response to normative reasons which lead 
to disagreement with others, realizing that others have grounds for their 
reasons will make accepting this alternative reason as an obligation 
more tolerable. Hence, political practice should involve also a rational as-
sessment and a discussion of the perspectives on the good supported by 
the members of the community. 
It can be concluded that the debates about realism in epistemology, 
action theory, normative theory and ethics have important consequences 
on political philosophy too, and that a careful study of latter is needed.6 
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